PROYECTO DE LA DECLARACI?N DE LOS PRINCIPIOS DE LA PR?CTICA LACANIANA
An epoch like the present one,

in which there is a pretension of measuring the results of psychoanalysis in quantitative or comparable terms, according to the principle of direct utility,

in which the debate on the efficacy of analysis is departing from the psychoanalytic societies in order to settle in the mass media,

in which the joint operation of the pharmacological market and the cognitive-behavioral therapies intends, in the name of a false scientific objectivity, to damage the prestige of psychoanalysis,

in which the traditional psychoanalytic associations call for State intervention to legislate analytic diplomas,

in which the University is getting ready to take on the accreditation of a psychoanalyst’s training, and the qualifications of his practice,

this is an epoch when the safeguarding of psychoanalysis requires:
to tighten the ties with all those who resist the reduction of man to a countable figure,

this is an epoch when the extension of psychoanalysis requires:
new alliances between pure psychoanalysis and its applied form,

this is an epoch when the survival of psychoanalysis depends:
on its capacity for transformation, on its advancement in the social field and on its insertion into the institutional field,

In this epoch, therefore,
which is not one that knew Freud,
which is not one that knew Lacan,
the psychoanalysts of the World Association of Psychoanalysis
take charge of the defense of psychoanalysis.
And decide

to create all the necessary instances for the extension of the practice of psychoanalysis and for the renovation of the training of analysts,

to train analysts capable of facing a new configuration of the clinic and of the practice,

to offer the results of psychoanalysis to a qualitative evaluation while respecting the structure proper to the analytic act, the historical pluralism of its interpretations and the self-regulation of the psychoanalytic association,

we let the principles that orientate our practice and our training be known to all those who are interested in psychoanalysis as a doctrine, as a method, or as a therapeutics, so that they may know what they may expect of a Lacanian analysis.

The Lacanian analysts, since we do not believe that identification
with any ideal whatsoever could reduce subjective suffering

Do not use the power of suggestion, which hypnotizes and does away with responsibility.

Do not maintain that psychoanalysis is a dialogue.

Do not pretend to accomplish any emotional or moral re-education. For this reason, we refrain from any empathic or identificatory understanding of the patient.
Renounce all pedagogical ideals and all attempts to model the patient in our own image.

Do not exert any direction of the conscience or spiritual guidance of the patient.

Do not claim to represent any principle of reality for the patient, because we do not confound reality with the Real.

We deny the existence of a conflict-free sphere of the ego, and in consequence, the possibility of any therapeutic alliance whatsoever with the healthy part of the ego.

We do not aspire to reinforce the inhibitory function of the ego, nor its function of synthesis, nor of adaptation.

The Lacanian analysts, because we consider that any therapeutic method which operates through conditioning has ends of social control,

Do not utilize any technique of relaxation, nor seek any altered state of consciousness, which deprives the patient of the meaning of his symptoms.

Nor do we diminish anguish and inhibition through techniques of positive reinforcement that could distract the patient from the cause of his suffering.

We do not think that the unconscious has its seat in the brain, nor that the laws of its functioning are to be deduced from neurobiology, nor that the Freudian drive is a complex set of brain activities.

We do not believe that psychoanalysis can be integrated into the framework of the cognitive sciences.

The Lacanian analysts, because we may practice psychoanalysis outside of the
psychoanalytic discourse, strictly speaking, specify:

that applied psychoanalysis is not psychotherapy,

that psychoanalysis applied to the therapeutic always remains psychoanalysis,

that psychoanalysis is applied as a treatment, and nevertheless, only with a subject who speaks and listens,

that psychoanalysis is not therapeutics like the others,

that therapeutic prudence justifies a moderation of the analytic effects by the analyst.

The Lacanian analysts, because we follow the logic of the analytic discourse and respond to the consequences of the act that we authorize, affirm:

that to practice psychoanalysis it is necessary to have been through the analytic experience,

that the analysis of the analyst should be pushed as far as possible,

that we count on the necessary dispositions to evaluate the effects of an analysis beyond its duration and its frequency,

that the analyst is only authorized by himself, and by certain others,

that the supervision of the practice is not contingent, but necessary,

that the analysis of a patient can be concluded, while it is not possible to determine the conclusion of the formation of an analyst,

that we do not consider that the analytic cure has to be conducted in a defined and untouchable setting

that we do not estimate that the optimal setting would be constituted by four regular weekly sessions, of a long and fixed duration,

that we do not think that the classical disposition – the patient lying on a couch and the analyst seated behind, out of his field of vision – is the only one indicated for the application of psychoanalysis.

that the Lacanian setting is minimalist: requiring only that the analyst and the patient meet in the same space at the same time. This requires a corporal presence. In consequence, we do not practice analysis via
the Internet even though the analyst and analysand may use all the technical means available to communicate from a distance should it be necessary.

that the Lacanian session is the shortest one possible, but might not be so,

that the duration of a session is unpredictable, and that is the resort of its effect.

that an interpretation of which the effects are predictable, is not an interpretation.

that the interpretation is a-semantic: it does not translate the words of an analysand, nor does it transmit knowledge. And even when it appears to be explaining, it is aiming at something else.

that the session as whole is a-semantic: it goes against the proliferation of sense. And that is one of the reasons for its brevity.

that in the analytic experience there is no symmetry between the place of the analysand and that of the analyst.

that the subjectivity of the analyst is an obstacle for the direction of the treatment.

that the training of the analyst consists in preparing himself for not being a subject from the moment he is practicing. The tripod composed by the analysis, the supervision and the study of texts is subordinated to

that end.

that we do not make use of the counter transference as an instrument for acceding to the unconscious of the patient.

that the analytic practice is governed by the principle of abstinence: the analyst does not enjoy his unconscious, the analysand does not enjoy the free association.

that we do not interpret the transference as an illusion, nor as an error, nor as repetition. This is equivalent to saying that we do not interpret the transference.

that we do not expect any liquidation of the transference at the end of the analysis; only its transformation.

that the experience of an analysis does not promise happiness.

that the experience of analysis may clarify the desire of the subject and help him to decipher “that” which insists in his existence,

that there are no apriori counter indications to analysis,

that a practice does not have to be clarified in order to operate.



Presented by the General Delegate, Graciela Brodsky, to the General Assembly of the AMP at Commandatuba,
Brazil, 6th August, 2004.